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AGAINST ‘AGAINST DATA EXCEPTIONALISM’*
by
DAN JERKER B. SVANTESSON**
The April 2016 issue of the Stanford Law Review (Volume 68, Issue 4) contains
an interesting article by Assistant Professor Andrew Keane Woods. In that article,
titled  ‘Against  Data  Exceptionalism’,  Woods  seeks  to  challenge  the  view  that
the nature of data is incompatible with existing territorial notions of jurisdiction.
He argues that the nature of data is not unique, and that existing jurisdictional
principles rooted in territoriality can be applied to data.
This  is  my response  to  his  claims.  I  argue  that  Woods  fails  to  refute  ‘data
exceptionalism’, and that his description of relevant jurisdictional issues is based
on a misunderstanding leading to a conflation of different jurisdictional questions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Some twenty years ago, we got to enjoy what arguably is the to-date most
interesting  academic  sparring  on the  Internet  law arena.  I  am of  course
referring  to  the  fascinating  exchange  between  Johnson  and  Post  in  one
corner,  and  Goldsmith  in  the  other.  In  their  classic  Law  And  Borders  -
The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, published in 1996 in the Stanford Law Review,
Johnson and Post sought to illustrate that Cyberspace  should be viewed
as a separate ‘space’,1 beyond the control of individual nations’ regulation.
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Moreover, the article suggested that, to the extent that this separate space
is to  be  regulated,  such  regulations  would  emerge  in  the  form
of self-regulation.2 Goldsmith  replied  with  his,  equally  classic,  Against
Cyberanarchy published in 1998 in the University of Chicago Law Review,
arguing that
“Cyberspace  transactions  are  no  different  from ‘real-space’  transnational
transactions.  […] There is  no general normative argument that  supports
the immunization of cyberspace activities from territorial regulation.”3
This  was followed by Post’s  perhaps somewhat less noticed,  but  equally
engaging,  article  Against  ‘Against  Cyberanarchy’ published  in  2002
in Berkeley Technology Law Journal.4
The core issues  debated then remain relevant today, and Goldsmith’s
influence is clear on the arguments Woods now presents in his recent article
Against  Data  Exceptionalism5 published  in  Stanford  Law  Review.  Indeed,
Woods was presumably inspired by Goldsmith’s choice of title. Since my
aim with this  note  is  to  refute  some of  Woods’  key claims,  I  thought  it
appropriate to similarly draw inspiration from Post’s choice of title.
Yet, it is not just the respective choices of titles that the discussion below
has  in  common  with  the  famous  academic  exchange  mentioned  above.
Like Goldsmith, Woods is committed to the territoriality principle, and like
the cyberlibertarians I (like many other recent commentators) consider that
the territoriality thinking fails us in the online context. At the same time,
as Woods  correctly  notes,  the  discussion  to  be  had  now  is  somewhat
different  to  the  debates  that  go  before  it.  Speaking  about  the  exchange
between Johnson and Post on the one hand and Goldsmith on the other,
he points out that:
“That scholarship was largely about spillovers: behavior in one state spilling
over into another state via the Internet. The jurisdictional question in such
2 Id. at 1367.
3 Goldsmith, J. L. 1998. Against Cyberanarchy, The University of Chicago Law Review,  vol. 65,
no. 4, pp. 1199-1250.
4 Post, D. 2002. Against ‘Against Cyberanarchy’, Berkeley Technology Law Journal, vol. 17, no. 4,
pp. 1365-1388. 
5 Woods, A. K. 2016. Against Data Exceptionalism, Stanford Law Review, vol. 68, no. 4, pp. 729-
790.
2016] D. J. B. Svantesson: Against 'Against Data Exceptionalism' 202
a case is whether a nation may “apply its law to extraterritorial  behavior
with substantial local effects”.”6
In contrast, Woods’ article and this response are concerned with
“how a nation can apply its laws to local behavior with local effects when
the data related to the act happens to be stored in the global cloud.”7
Nevertheless, ‘exceptionalism’ and territoriality occupy centre stage now
as they did then.
The stated aim of Woods’ article is to challenge the view that the nature
of  data  is  incompatible  with  existing  territorial  notions  of  jurisdiction. 8
To achieve this, he seeks to illustrate that the nature of data is not unique
(his Part II), and that existing jurisdictional principles rooted in territoriality
can be applied to data (his Part III). It is those two parts of his article I focus
on,  and  here  I  do  not  seek  to  comment  on  his  problem  and  context
description  (his  Part  I)  or  his  observations  as  to  transnational  conflicts
of laws  and proposals  for  how the  Electronic  Communications  Privacy  Act
should be reformed (his Parts IV and V). 
2.  MY  PERSPECTIVE  AND  HOW  IT  CLASHES  WITH
WOODS’ 
Woods explains to us that:
“Despite the technological wizardry of modern life, the “cloud” is actually
a network of storage drives bolted to a particular territory […]. Moreover,
even  if  the  cloud  were  a  free-floating  ether,  data  can  be  thought  of
as an intangible asset, like money or debt, which flows across borders; courts
have  been  adjudicating  such  jurisdictional  disputes  for  centuries.
These precedents suggest numerous grounds for states to assert jurisdiction
over data.“9
For some time now, I have – without seeking my arguments in wizardry
or mysticism –  argued that  strict  territoriality  is  ill-equipped for  today’s
modern society characterised by constant, fluid and substantial cross-border
6 Id. at 738 (footnotes omitted).
7 Id. at 738.
8 Id. at 729.
9 Id. at 719.
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interaction,  not  least  via  the  Internet.  This  places  me  in  the  same  boat,
or at least  in  the  same flotilla,  as  the  scholars,  practitioners  and Internet
companies Woods claims to prove wrong in his article. 
In  an  article  published  in  the  American  Journal  of  International  Law
Unbound in  2015,  I  advanced  a  proposal  for  a  new  jurisprudential
framework for jurisdiction that is not based on the territoriality principle: 
“In  the  absence  of  an  obligation  under  international  law  to  exercise
jurisdiction, a State may only exercise jurisdiction where:
(1) there is a substantial connection between the matter and the State
seeking to exercise jurisdiction; 
(2) the State seeking to exercise jurisdiction has a legitimate interest
in the matter; and
(3) the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable given the balance between
the State’s legitimate interests and other interests.“10
I  take  the  view  that  the  territoriality  thinking  that  is  characteristic
of the current paradigm is  inadequate in  many areas such as e.g.  human
rights law, environmental law, and anti-trust law; that is, the problems that
come  to  the  fore  when  applying  a  territoriality  thinking  to  the  online
environment  is  merely  yet  another  example  of  why  territoriality  fails
as a foundational  core  principle  for  jurisdiction  in  our  modern  world.
Thus, my  proposal  does  not  depend  on  data  exceptionalism  as  such.
Nevertheless, I present a distinctly territoriality-nihilistic view that clashes
with Woods’ assertion that
“the  data  exceptionalists  are  wrong  to  suggest  that  the  cloud  changes
anything  fundamental  as  a  matter  of  prescriptive  jurisdiction
or enforcement jurisdiction; the same old (territorial) rules apply to this new
Internet technology.”11
 In other words, as my claim gains strength from data exceptionalism,
if Woods is right, that undermines my claim.
10 Svantesson,  D.  J.  B.  2015.  A  New  Jurisprudential  Framework  for  Jurisdiction:
Beyond the Harvard  Draft:  Comment  on  “A  New  Jurisprudential  Framework
for Jurisdiction”, American Journal of International Law Unbound, vol. 109, pp. 69-74.
11 Woods, supra note 5 at 765.
2016] D. J. B. Svantesson: Against 'Against Data Exceptionalism' 204
3. LACKING SHARPNESS OF FOCUS
Before moving into the substance, it should be noted that it is not always
easy to understand what Woods actually is committing to in his arguments.
For  example,  he  variously  claims  that  “data  is  not  as  novel  as  the  data
exceptionalists  suggest”12,  and  that  “data  is  not  conceptually  exceptional”.13
Of course, under the first  claim,  he is  not disputing the novelty as such,
he just asserts that some people may have overstated the degree of novelty.
In the second claim, he asserts that the relevant features are, in a binary
sense, not exceptional. It would have been better had he committed to one
view and stuck with it.
More  importantly,  despite  the  article’s  title  being  “Against  Data
Exceptionalism”  Woods,  does  not  actually  do  much  to  oppose  data
exceptionalism as such. Rather what Woods is in fact opposing – while he
stubbornly  sticks  to  the  misguided  label  of  “data  exceptionalism”  –
is “cloud  data  exceptionalism”,  and  indeed  on  some  occasions  “cloud
exceptionalism”14. As he himself expressly acknowledges:
“To be clear, these claims are not solely about the nature of data, but rather
about the role of data in the cloud.”15
The distinction between  data exceptionalism on the one hand, and  cloud
data exceptionalism on the other, is not merely a stylistic matter. For example,
even if Woods would have refuted the claim of cloud data exceptionalism –
and I  do not  think he has done so – it  would remain possible  to argue
for data exceptionalism.
4. WOODS FAILS TO REFUTE “DATA EXCEPTIONALISM”
To  prove  that  cloud  data  lacks  a  novelty  that  would  support  the  data
exceptionalist  view,  Woods  takes  the  reader  on  a  laborious  journey
involving  the exercises  of  mapping  out  what  features  could make cloud
data unique, and why in fact these features do not make such data unique.
The  features  Woods  attribute  to  cloud  data  are  (1)  intangibility,
(2) mobility,  (3)  divisibility  and fungibility  and (4)  the  distance  between
12 Id. at 763.
13 Id. at 764.
14 “the jurisdictional challenges presented by the global cloud are not conceptually as novel
as they seem.” Id. at 729.
15 Id. at 755.
205 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 10:2
the asset  holder  and  the  asset.  It  is  not  clear  why  he  opted  for  these
particular features, at the expense of other relevant features such as the fact
that data can relate to several persons at the same time thereby creating
simultaneous jurisdictional links to multiple states. Either way, since courts
can choose to treat data as either an intangible or tangible asset, Woods also
analyses data as a tangible asset.
For  each  of  the  mentioned  features,  Woods  shows  that  they  are  not
unique. For example, in showing that intangibility is not on its own a novel
feature,  he  points  to  the  fact  that  courts  have  adjudicated  disputes
over intangible  assets  like  stock  and  debts  for  many  years.
Similarly, to show that mobility as a feature of an asset class is not unique
to data,  Woods  stresses  that  money  can  be  wired  from  one  location
to another in an instant.
His approach is, however, misguided both in relation to each individual
component  it  addresses  and as  a  whole.  For  example,  under  a  heading
suggesting a discussion of the fact that data are ‘divisible’ and ‘fungible’,
Woods  embarks  on  an  elaborate  discussion  of  how  users  do  not  care
whether  their  content,  as  presented  by  cloud  companies,  is  represented
by the “same” ones and zeros as they themselves upload.16 This is of course
not  of  any  interest  whatsoever,  and  Woods  would  have  done  better
ignoring  such  imaginary  issues  and  instead  paying  attention  to  real
problems such as the difficulty of attributing a location to data that exists
in fragments on multiple servers rather than as a whole on any one server. 
Further,  in  showing  the  lacking  uniqueness  of  intangibility,  Woods
enthusiastically points to how:
“courts  have come up with a number of  different approaches  to  locating
intangible assets. For example, intellectual property rights like trademarks
are typically found to be located wherever they were created or registered.
Debts are typically located where the debtor resides—as that is typically,
though not always, where steps can be taken to ameliorate the debt.“17
However, he does nothing to consider  whether any of these methods
would  actually  work  in  relation  to  data.  Would  it,  for  example,
be appropriate to locate data wherever they were created (data not being
‘registered’ removes one of the mentioned ground automatically)? Or can
16 Id. at 759-760.
17 Id. at 756-757.
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data be located to where the ‘data subject’ resides? The point is that unless
the  solutions  advanced in  relation  to other  intangibles  may prove to be
of use also for data, Woods’ exercise tells us very little of interest. 
Furthermore, as to money – the type of intangible he relies on the most –
he seems to completely overlook the fact that money in its modern form is
in fact also data – it is because money is data that it can be ‘wired’ from one
side of the planet to another. Thus, no aspect of money can be used to argue
that  data  is  not  unique  since  all  he  is  doing  is  arguing  that  data  is  not
unique  as  data  (in  the  form  of  money)  unsurprisingly  shares
the characteristics of data. 
The most serious flaw in Woods’ approach here is, however, his failure
to consider, in a cumulative manner, the features he discusses; that is even if
he  manages  to  find  similarities  in  relation  to  each  of  the  features  he
discusses, unless he finds some intangible that shares  all of those features,
the  uniqueness  of  cloud  data  has  clearly  not  been  refuted.  It  is  simply
remarkable that he makes the claim that
“None of the features that are thought to make data novel are in fact novel—
whether the features are considered individually or as a whole,”18
when in fact he has only discussed the features individually, not as a whole.
5. WOODS AND POSSIBLE GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION
The part of Wood’s article in which he seeks to convince the reader that all
is well in the application of existing jurisdictional principles to the setting
of cloud data opens with a telling, and rather terrifying, claim:
”Jurisdiction is and likely always will be rooted in territoriality. States are
the sovereigns of  their territory and their citizens.  Accordingly, they can
regulate  acts  taking  place  on  their  soil  as  well  as  acts  that  affect  their
citizens,  regardless  of  the  location  of  those  acts.  This  means that  a  state
might legitimately assert its jurisdiction over a piece of data because that
data or its controller is located in the state’s territory, or simply because
the data is needed for law enforcement there, regardless of where the data
is stored or where the company is headquartered.”19
18 Id. at 763 (emphasis added).
19 Id. at 764 (footnote omitted).
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I  say  terrifying  as  it  would  be  worrying  indeed  if  any  state  could
demand access  to  any  piece  of  data  it  wanted,  anywhere  in  the  world,
simply because the data is needed for law enforcement there, for example
in order to pursue human rights advocates, political dissidents and others
perceived as undesirables by that state. 
The telling part of the quote is that it reveals a deep misunderstanding
of jurisdiction  in  the  sense  of  a  conflation  of  two  separate  matters.
Under orthodox  thinking,  states  can  indeed  regulate  acts taking  place
on their soil as well as acts that affect their citizens, regardless of the location
of  those  acts.  However,  that  does not  tell  us  anything  about jurisdiction
over a piece of data that is stored outside the state by a company with no link
to that state. The first is a matter of jurisdiction over the offense, the other
a matter  of  jurisdiction  over  the  data  that  e.g. may  be  used  as  evidence
in relation to that offense.   
At any rate, the fact that grounds for jurisdiction can be found, or indeed
imagined, says nothing about their suitability, and it does not bring Woods
any further  on his  quest  against  cloud data exceptionalism.  Rather  here,
again  in  a  Don  Quixote  like  fashion,  Woods  vigorously  engages
with imaginary  opponents,  while  staying  well  clear  of  the  many  real
obstacles to the claims he makes. As noted by Clopton in his interesting
response to Woods’ article:
”[T]he most telling statement in Woods’s excellent article comes early on:
“Showing that the jurisdictional challenges presented by the global cloud are
not conceptually novel does not resolve those problems…” Data may not be
exceptional, and the legal puzzles posed by data sound in existing notions
of jurisdiction and conflict of laws. The problem, however, is that existing
answers to these puzzles are unsatisfying. They are unsatisfying in that they
do  not  provide  clear  answers,  but  instead  pose  even  more  challenging
normative  questions.  And they  are  unsatisfying  because  some consensus
answers sit on shaky normative footing.”20
It  is  quite  simply  impossible  to  imagine  any  situation  in  relation
to which it is not possible to imagine a jurisdictional rule as long as one is
freed from the responsibility of finding a jurisdictional  rule that actually
works well for that situation. Thus, for example, in stating that we can base
20 Clopton, Z. D. 2016. Data Institutionalism: A Reply to Andrew Woods, Stanford Law Review
Online, vol. 69, pp. 1-9 (footnote omitted).
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jurisdiction on the location of data,21 Woods blissfully ignores the difficulty
of how we address situations where a decision about jurisdiction must be
made by a party (e.g. a law enforcement agency) that is not able to ascertain
the location of the data, at the time the decision as to jurisdiction must be
made.  
Furthermore, in Woods’ discussion of jurisdiction based on the location
of  the  harm,22 we  again  see  worrying  signs  of  confusion  resulting
in conflation. Here he claims that:
“States have a considerable interest in ensuring that their laws are enforced.
For  this  reason,  one  sound  basis  for  jurisdiction  would  be  to  say  that
the state  where  the  crime  occurred  has  a  compelling  interest  in  gaining
access to digital evidence necessary to enforce its laws.”23
Having  provided  an  example  of  Scotland Yard investigating  a  string
of bank robberies in  London, in  relation to which critical  evidence likely
resides on one of the suspect’s Dropbox accounts, Woods concludes that:
“No one doubts  that  the  U.K.  Parliament has  the  legislative  jurisdiction
to pass  a  law  criminalizing  bank  robbery.  Indeed,  it  has  a  rock-solid
jurisdictional  basis  for  doing  so—namely,  controlling  the  activities  that
occur on its soil.”24
Here he is, however, no longer talking about jurisdiction over the data
but rather jurisdiction over the criminal matter as such. Indeed, he admits
this by going on to note that:
“Getting access to digital evidence related to a U.K. crime—evidence that
may  or  may  not  be  in  the  United  Kingdom’s  territory—is  a  question
of enforcement jurisdiction, which will be discussed in more detail below.”25
Thus, in the end, the disappointing conclusion must be that all Woods is
saying  about  prescriptive  jurisdiction  is  actually  irrelevant  for  the  topic
ofJhis article which is instead focused on enforcement jurisdiction – or as I
21 Woods, supra note 5 at 766-767.
22 Id. at 767-768.
23 Id. at 767.
24 Id. at 767-768.
25 Id. at 768.
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have argued elsewhere, “investigative jurisdiction”26 – in the form of getting
access to digital evidence. 
Unfortunately,  no  compensation  for  this  disappointment  is  found
in Woods’  treatment  of  enforcement  jurisdiction.  Here  he  merely  echoes
conventional claims such as that states can exercise enforcement jurisdiction
only against persons or entities with either a presence or with assets within
that  state’s  territory.27 This  brings us  no  closer  to  solutions,  and indeed,
it does little for Woods’ crusade against cloud data exceptionalism. 
Finally,  in  this  context,  to  understand Woods’  willingness,  or  indeed
eagerness, to embrace sub-standard grounds for jurisdiction with obvious
practical flaws, we must understand his point of departure which is found
in  a  legitimate,  albeit  unhelpfully  one-dimensional,  concern  about  law
enforcement  efficiency,  as  well  as  in  misguided  conceptions
as to the necessary consequences of data exceptionalism. 
Starting  with  the  latter  of  these  concerns,  we  can  note  how  Woods
asserts that
“if data is not as different as many have suggested, then states need not
commit to narrowly defining their authority over data based on a single test,
such as the location of the data or the domicile of the company.”28
However,  it  is  not  clear  why  data  exceptionalism  would  force  us
to commit to narrowly defining authority over data based on a single test.
Equally  surprisingly,  Woods  assumes  that  data  exceptionalists  are  those
who  “argue  that  data  challenges  territorial  conceptions  of  sovereignty  and
therefore  cries  out  for  a  global  treaty”29 (emphasis  added).  Obviously,  data
exceptionalists  may  also  promote  the  option  of  a  global  treaty.
However, they but need not do so. To conclude, data exceptionalism may
not necessitate all that Woods suggests it does.
Discussing  a  hypothetical  scenario  in  which  an  Indian  woman  is
murdered  in  India,  with  the  primary  suspect  being  an  Indian  man,
and the only link outside India being that the Indian police wishes to get
26 Svantesson, D. J. B. 2014.  The Extraterritoriality of EU Data Privacy Law - Its Theoretical
Justification and Its Practical Effect on U.S. Businesses, Stanford Journal of International Law,
vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 53-102.
27 Woods, supra note 5 at 769-770.
28 Id. at 735.
29 Id. at 788.
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access to the suspects Google account, Woods complains that it is “unfair”
that
“the Indian law enforcement agent must ask an American judge to sign off
on her request to receive access to the data, despite the fact that an Indian
magistrate has already deemed the data crucial to the investigation.”30
It  is  easy  to  sympathise  with  Woods’  concern.  However,  if  we,
in the example, replace all references to ‘India’ with ‘North Korea’, and we
change the crime from ‘murder’ to ‘political dissent’, the picture changes.
Thus,  the  ‘North  Korea  test’  illustrates  that  the  perceived  unfairness
in Woods’  example  only  holds  in  relation  to  (a)  certain  crimes,
and (b) certain countries.31 This severely undermines the correctness of his
perception  of  the  ills  that  will  flow  from  an  acceptance  of  data
exceptionalism.
6. FINAL REMARKS
Given  the  above,  Woods’  attack  on  cloud  data  exceptionalism,  and  his
accompanied  defence  of  territoriality,  fizzles  out  into  nothingness.
His perhaps most important claim that
“in  many  ways,  it  is  easier  for  courts  to  assert  jurisdiction  over  data
than over intangible assets because, unlike debts or stock, data has a physical
and therefore territorial presence wherever it is stored”32
quite  simply  ignores  too  large  parts  of  reality  to  be  afforded  general
applicability.  First,  a  theoretical  location  helps  little  when  at  the  time
a jurisdictional decision is made that location is practically unascertainable.
Second, as the location of data can be so easily manipulated, the wisdom
of attaching significance to the location of data is questionable. Thus, in my
assessment, Woods – despite his bold claims – have neither refuted cloud
data exceptionalism nor data exceptionalism. And it remains my view that
the difficulty of determining the location of data, and especially of cloud
30 Id. at 745-746.
31 Woods  would  presumably  agree  with  this  given  some  of  his  other  writings
(see e.g.: Jennifer Daskal and Andrew Keane Woods, Cross-Border Data Requests: A Proposed
Framework,  Lawfare  November  24,  2015  https://lawfareblog.com/cross-border-data-
requests-proposed-framework).
32 Woods, supra note 5 at 761.
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data,  undermines  the  prevalent  territoriality  thinking.  As  noted  by  Post
in Against ‘Against Cyberanarchy’,
“Settled law, and received principles, are worthy of respect; but at times
they need to be reconsidered. This is one of those times.”33
This remains true today.
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